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Mistake as to Identity and the Threads of Objectivity 
Mistake as to Identity and 
the Threads of 
40 ty Objectivi 
Dr. Adrian Chandler and Dr. James Devenney* 
Mistake as to identity during the contracting process has proved to be a fruitful source of academic 
debate for more than a century'. The typical scenario involves A selling goods to B, where B, by 
cunning artifice, persuades A that he is actually dealing with C. B then sells the goods onwards to 
X, an innocent third party who wishes to assert his title to the goods as against A. Armed with a 
series of seemingly contradictory judicial dicta, and presented with a range of factual scenarios, 
academic tutors have expected students to draw distinctions of extreme subtlety in order to 
determine whether the ensuing contract between A and B was void for mistake, or simply voidable 
for fraud. The ability to distinguish the substance of a person's identity from any severable 
attributes, and to comprehend the importance of the factual context in which negotiations took 
place, seemed pivotal to the proffering of justifiable, albeit speculative conclusions. However, such 
intellectual entertainment does little to serve the twin cornerstones of certainty and predictability 
upon which the international reputation of the English Law of Contract is based. Thus, in recently 
commenting on the state of the law in this area, Sedley L1 seemed justified in concluding: 
"The illogical and sometimes barer perceptible distinctions made in earlier decisions, some of them 
representing an unarticulated judicial polio on the incidence of loss as between innocent parties, 
112 continue to represent the law: 
In such circumstances the recent House of Lords' decision in Shogun Finance Ltd v Hudson' was 
eagerly anticipated. The facts were that B, a rogue, agreed to purchase a car from CV Ltd for 
approximately ¬22,250, subject to obtaining hire-purchase finance. B produced a driving licence in 
the name of Mr Patel. This licence was genuine but had been obtained unlawfully. CV Ltd faxed a 
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copy of the driving licence, plus all other personal details supplied by B, to Shogun Finance Ltd, 
the respondents. Shogun instituted a thorough credit reference search through various agencies, 
including a check on any county court judgments or bankruptcy orders registered against Mr Patel. 
This search produced a "credit score" that automatically resulted in acceptance of the finance 
proposal. Having decided that the signatures on the faxed copies of the driving licence and the 
agreement form matched, Shogun informed CV Ltd that the proposal was accepted. B 
subsequently sold the car for approximately £17,000 to Hudson, the appellant, who intended to 
use it in his recently established courtesy car business. At first instance the assistant recorder ruled 
that the `contract' between Shogun and B was void for mistake of identity and therefore no title 
could pass to Hudson under s 27 of the Hire- Purchase Act, 1964.4 The Court of Appeal, by a 
majority, rejected Hudson's appeal, employing a literal definition of the word "debtor" in s 27. 
However, in particular, the judgments of Dyson and Brooke L JJ are more noteworthy for their 
obiter comments on the confused state of the case-law surrounding mistaken identity. ' 
The House of Lords, by a simple majority (Lords Nicholls and Millett dissenting), rejected the 
appeal. The nature of the appeal" and the fact that their Lordships delivered separate speeches 
makes the task of distilling a common set of principles more conjectural. However, basic 
unanimity was achieved on the following propositions: (1) The issue in this appeal was essentially 
one of offer and acceptance, ' (2) An objective appraisal of the facts will determine to whom an 
offer was made and by whom it was accepted, ' (3) In face to face dealings it is, at the very least, a 
very strong presumption that the parties intended to deal with each other; ie their physical 
presence rather than any assumed identity, 9 and (4) The majority decision in Ingram v Little should 
be overruled. 1° There also appeared to be clear dissatisfaction with previous case-law that had 
emphasised the importance of distinguishing a person's identity from his attributes. " However, 
differences of opinion emerged when considering contracts concluded by written correspondence, 
irrespective of whether this had led to a formal written contract. Was the offer and acceptance 
concluded between the named parties, or the persons who actually wrote the letters and/or signed 
the final written contract? In particular, could the presumption with regard to face to face dealings 
be extended to all forms of communication, or should it be reversed where negotiations had been 
conducted, or the final signature appended, inter absentes? 
Before considering these issues, it would appear apposite to examine briefly the provisions of Part 
III of the Hire Purchase Act 1964, which were, of course, at the centre of this case. We can then 
offer some tentative guidance on how the House of Lords' decision in Shogun has affected our 
general understanding of this troubled area of "mistaken identity". 
4 As substituted Irv the Consumer Credit Act 1974, s 192(3)(a), Sch 4, para 22. 
5 Shogun Finance Ltd v Hudson (2001] EWCA Civ 
1000; (2002] QB 834 at (11 ] and [511 respectively. 
6 See Lord Hobhouse (2003] UKHL 62; [200313 WLR 
1371 at (44], who was keen to stress that the appeal 
solely concerned the "application of this statutory 
provision to the facts of the case (no more, no less). " 
7 See, for example, Lord Walker, ibid at (183]. 
8 Ibid at (61 per Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead, (461 per 
Lord Hobhouse, (651 per Lord Millets, (1251 per Lord 
Phillips, and (1831 per Lord Walker. 
9 Ibid at [371 per Lord Nicholls, (671 per Lord Millets, 
1170] per Lord Phillips and (1851 per Lord Walker. 
10 (1961] 1 QB 31. See (20031 UKHL 62; 120031.3 
WLR 1371 at 11101 per Lord Millets, (18.5] per Lord 
Walker, implicitly supported by Lord Nicholls at [221 
and (361, and Lord Phillips at 11471 and (1701. 
11 See, for example, (20031 IJKHL 62; (2003] .3 
WLR 
1371 at (5] per Lord Nicholls and at (591 per Lord 
Millets. 
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1. Part III of the Hire Purchase Act 1964 
In the factual situation outlined at the start of this paper, the effect of mistaken identity on the 
`contract' between A and B will have potentially serious implications for X: the ability of X to establish 
title will depend largely on whether the `contract' between A and B was void or merely voidable. If the 
`contract' between A and B is void, B will not acquire title and prima facie will not be able to transfer 
title to X: nemo dat quod non habet. ' 2 In such a situation A will be able to reclaim the goods. If, however, 
the contract between A and B is merely voidable, B will be able to transfer title' 3 to X provided A has 
not already avoided the contract; 14 consequently, A will not be able to reclaim the goods. 
If we move the factual postulate closer to the facts of Shogun, involving a hire purchase contract 
between A and B, it is clear that even if the contract is valid, B does not, initially at least, obtain 
title to the goods. ' S At this stage, adopting the nemo dat rule, B prima facie does not have the power 
to transfer title to the goods to X. 16 If, however, the goods involved are motor vehicles" B may be 
able to pass good title to X under Part III, Hire Purchase Act 1964, '8 provided X is a `private 
purchaser"9 who acts in good faith and without notice of the hire purchase agreement. 2° 
Does it matter whether the hire-purchase `contract' between A and B is either void or voidable? 
Can B still pass title to X? Although the Act is slightly ambiguous on this matter, 21 the generally 
accepted view has been that B cannot pass good title to X if the hire purchase `contract' is either 
void or was voidable and has been avoided prior to the disposition to X. 22 Certainly this seems to 
be the better view of Part III, Hire Purchase Act 1964 when considered as a whole, 23 an approach 
that was adopted by the majority in Shogun where the `contract' between A and B was void. 
Separately, Lords Nicholls and Millett proceeded on the basis that B could pass title under Part III, 
Hire Purchase Act 1964 where the hire purchase contract between A and B was merely voidable, 
albeit where it had not been avoided. 24 Therefore in Shogun it was vital to determine whether or not 
the putative contract was void. 
12 Theoretically, the nemo dat exception contained in the 
Factors Act 1889, s9 (substantially reproduced in Sale 
of Goods Act 1979, s 25), seems applicable, but to rely 
upon this exception B must have obtained possession of 
the goods with the consent of the A, a requirement 
unlikely to be satisfied where the `contract' is void for 
mistake of identity: see Du Jardin v Beadman Brothers 
Ltd [195212 QB 712,718. 
13 Assuming that, as between A and B, it was intended 
that property in the goods uvs to pass immediately to 
B: cf Sale of Goods Act 1979, s 17 . 
14 Sees 23 of the Sale of Goods Act 1979, and its 
application in Car & Universal Finance Ltd v Caldwell 1196511 QB 525. 
15 See, for example, Helby v Matthews 11895] AC 471. 
16 Moreover, B is not someone who has "bought or agreed 
to buy" goods for the purposes of the Factors Act 1889, 
s 9: Helby v Matthews 11895] AC 471. 
17 This term is defined in s 29(1) of the Hire Purchase 
Act 1964. 
18 See, however, s 29(5). 
19 Defined in s 29(2) of the Hire Purchase Act 1964; see 
also Stevenson v Beverley Bentinck [197611 WLR 
483. 
20 See ss 27(1) and 27(2) of the Hire Purchase Act 1964. 
For the position where X is not a private purchaser, see 
s 27(3). 
21 Cf the use of the word "a" in s 27(1) and the 
definition of debtor in s 29(4). If one wished to argue 
that B could pass good title to X where the hire- 
purchase `contract' was void, one might refer to the 
legislative evolution of these provisions; see Davies, 
Wrongful Dispositions of Motor Vehicles -A Legal 
Quagmire 119951 JBL 
. 
36,417-50- 
92 See Guest, The Law of Hire Purchase, (Sweet & 
Maxwell, London 1966) at 769-770; Goode, Hire 
Purchase Law and Practice, 2nd ed. (Butterworths, 
London, 1970), at 619-620; Goode, Commercial Lau; 
2nd ed, (Penguin, London, 1995) at 4717; and. Guest 
(ed), Benjamin's Sale of Goods, 6th ed, (Sweet & 
Maxwell, London, 2002), at 7-088. Compare also 
Broom, Commercial Law, (Butterworths, London, 
2001) at 422. 
23 See, in particular, s 29(l). 
24 Cf the judgment of the Court of Appeal: 120011 
EWCA Civ 1000; [2002) QB 8.34, especially at [61 
and [351. In Shogun it was common ground that if the 
contract was merely voidable, it had not been avoided 
prior to the sale to X (see, for example, 1361). 
0 
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2. The Role of Objectivity 
A common thread permeating their Lordships' speeches in Shogun was the importance of objective 
factual analysis. Applying the standard rules of offer and acceptance was a sine qua non for 
determining whether the original hire purchase `contract' could permissibly transfer title to the 
appellant. Lord Millett, in effect, accurately summed up the approach adopted by all his colleagues 
when saying: 
"Whatever the medium of communication, a contract comes into existence if, on an objective appraisal 
of the facts there is sufficient correlation between offer and acceptance to make it possible to say that 
the impostor's offer has been accepted by the person to whom it was addressed". -" 
The difficulty, of course, is to define precisely what "objectivity" means in contract formation. 
Clearly the term denotes an analytical process devoid of either party's concealed, subjective 
motives and expectations. "' But from whose perspective? 2. ' Assuming that A makes an offer, how 
does one decide whether the offer has been made to B, or to C (the person who B claims to be)? 
Conversely, if B makes an offer to A, what relevant criteria should a court employ in determining 
whether A has accepted an offer from B that seemingly emanated from C? One option would be to 
view all the circumstances through the eyes of one of the contracting parties, A or B, and ask 
whether there had been an apparent exchange of offer and acceptance. 28 In the Court of Appeal, 
Dyson LJ considered the matter from B's perspective: "viewed objectively, should the rogue have 
interpreted the offer by the finance company as an offer to enter into the hire-purchase agreement 
with him or with Mr Patel? "-' 
Objectivity: a party-based perspective? 
One difficulty of interpreting the facts from one party's viewpoint is that B knows A believes he is 
dealing with C (which is why he practices his deception) whilst A assumes that he is making an offer 
to a named individual called C. "' Although a reasonable person might not be imbued with that 
knowledge, it is inevitable that a judgment of A's apparent intentions, or B's apparent knowledge, 
will be coloured either by B's underlying motivation which seeks to "modify" As intentions from 
the outset, or by As innocent assumption that B and C are one and the same person.; ' In Cundy v 
25 120031 I IKHL 62; [200313 WLR 1371 at 181 ]. 
26 See, for example, Trentham Ltd t" Archital Luxier 
11993] 1 Lloyd's Rep 25,27, where Steyn LJ explicitly 
disregarded the "sub. i ect i ve expectations and 
unexpressed mental reservations of the parties. " 
27 Relevant literature on this issue includes Spencer, 
Signature, Consent and the meaning of the Rule in L'Estrange v Qraucob 1197.31 CLJ 104; Howarth, The Meaning of Objectivity in Contract, (1984) 100 LQR 
265; Vorster, Comment on the Meaning of Objectivity 
in Contract, (1987) 103 LQR 265; and, de Moor, 
Intention in the Law of Contract: Elusive or Illusory (1990) 106 LQR 632. 
28 Traditionally one might consider how the promisee 
interpreted the promisor's intentions from the terms of 
the offer and the surrounding circumstances: see 
Qoodhart, Mistake as to Identity in Contract, (1941) 
57 LQR 228 especially at 231. 
29 (20011 EWCA Civ 1000; (2002] QB 834 at (40(. 
30 See Lewis t Ate-ray [19721 1 QB 198,208, where 
Megaw L1 questioned the efficacy of any test that 
depended "upon the view which some rogue should 
have formed, presumably knowing that he is a rogue, as 
to the state of mind of the opposite party to the 
negotiation, who does not know that he is dealing with 
a rogue . 
31 It is possible to draw an analogy here with the business 
efficacy test adopted in The Moorcock (1889) 14 PD 
64 in which terms are not implied on the basis of 
reasonableness, but by reasonable people possessing the 
known characteristics of the contracting parties. 
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Lindsay, 32 for example, a rogue called Blenkarn had ordered goods from the plaintiff respondents, 
pretending to be Blenkiron, a reputable hotelier. The goods were dispatched to Blenkarn's actual 
address, the same road from which Blenkiron operated, and were immediately sold on to the 
defendant. In the House of Lords, Lord Cairns LC considered the intention of the plaintiff with 
regard to Blenkarn and concluded forcefully: 
"Of him they knew nothing, and of him they never thought. With him they never intended to deal. Their 
minds never, for an instant of time, rested upon him, and as between him and them there was no 
consensus of mind which could lead to any agreement or any contract whatever". " 
It is clearly arguable that this approach displayed an over-reliance upon the subjective intentions of 
the plaintiff. Indeed, in Shogun, Lord Millett criticised the apparently subjective nature of the 
enquiry, 34 preferring to ignore the plaintiff's actual state of mind, induced by the fraud, and 
concentrate exclusively on whether a "sufficient correlation" existed between the offer and the 
acceptance. 35 It is difficult to find fault with such sentiments. Although courts strive to give effect 
to the parties' intentions, such intentions must be apparent, not merely held, otherwise we are in 
danger of substituting true consensus (ie of both parties) with an imposed consensus by just one 
party. This danger remains conspicuous when applying an objective test through the eyes of one 
or other party. Howarth, in considering "promisor objectivity" and "promisee objectivity" within 
the wider context of unilateral mistake, rightly cautioned that either method might produce a 
result more attuned to the parties' intentions but that one of the party's, more subjective, 
interpretation was bound to dominate in practice. Indeed, in the context of mistaken identity, 
other analytical flaws begin to emerge. First, if one adopts A's viewpoint, it is difficult to visualise 
circumstances where A would intend to deal with B. For example, in Ingram v Little, the Court of 
Appeal was faced with a very different set of facts in which the plaintiff had sold her car, after face- 
to-face negotiations, to a rogue masquerading as a Mr Hutchinson of Caterham. Devlin LJ, in a 
strongly worded dissenting judgment, criticised certain subjective aspects of the supposed 
"objective test", clearly adopted in Cundy, along the following lines: 
"If Miss Ingram had been asked whether she intended to contract with the man in the room or with Mr 
PQM Hutchinson, the question could have had no meaning for her, since she believed them both to the 
one and the same. The reasonable man of the law - if he stood in Miss Ingram's shoes - could not give 
any better answer". 37 
As Devlin LJ would have realised, such speculation simply generates a self-fulfilling prophecy as A 
would never consider the possibility that he was dealing with the wrong person, a point fully 
endorsed by Lord Walker in Shogun.; 
Secondly, if one adopts B's viewpoint, taking account of his intended deception, it is generally 
inconceivable that he would assume A wanted to deal with him (B), a fact that prompted B to act 
32 (1878) 3 App Cas 459. 
33 Ibid at 465. 
34 [20031 UKHL 62; [200,313 WLR 1371 at 1911. 
35 Ibid at [761, repeated at [811, [921 and 1931. Note the 
similarity with the Principles of European Contract 
Law (Art 2: 101) which requires a test of "sufficient 
agreement" between the parties. 
36 Op cit Howarth at 273. 
37 1196111 QB 31,65 (emphasis added). L. Ise of 
promisee objectivity clearly lay at the heart of the 
majority decision in Ingram; see Sellers LJ at 53-54 
and Pearce LJ at 55. 
38 See 120031 LIKHL 62; 1200.313 WLR 1371 at 11841. 
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fraudulently in the first place. " This was certainly the view of Hannen J in Smith t' Hughes where 
B's knowledge of A's mistake led to the conclusion that "he [B] is not entitled to insist that the 
promise shall be fulfilled in a sense to which the mind of the promisor did not assent". " 
Admittedly, courts require B to know4' of A's mistake, but this cannot be the sole pre-condition of 
contractual invalidity. 42 
Finally, it is admitted that prom isor/promisetobjectivity is not mutually exclusive and that different 
circumstances might encourage one or other method to be employed. Spencer, for example, argued 
that "promisee objectivity" is the norm but was subject to two exceptions: where the promisee 
knew of the promisor's mistake and, more significantly, where the promisee acted in a way which 
contributed to the promisor's mistake. 4; The problem here is that B knows of As mistake and 
specifically acts in a way which preserves As mistaken impression. If this led to reliance upon 
promisor objectivity then, following Cundy and Ingram, where A's subjective intentions manifestly 
dominated, A would invariably succeed in cases of mistaken identity. 
Shogun: Applying an objective test 
In Shogun, a precise definition of "objectivity" did not emerge in any of the speeches, but it seems 
reasonably clear that the majority of their Lordships avoided the adoption of a purely party-based 
perspective. 44 Rather, the consensus of opinion suggested a more detached form of objectivity, 
based on how a reasonable person would view the circumstances, 45 a pragmatic solution which 
avoids the problems of transposing the terminology of promisor/promise into a factual setting 
where the rogue may be either the offeror or the offeree. 4" However, this represents only part of the 
solution. Having identified the standpoint from which objectivity is assessed, it is then necessary 
to decide the object of the exercise: to whom or to what is the test to be applied? 
Unfortunately, at this point, any semblance of unanimity disappeared. Lord Nicholls shunned any 
attempt to discern, in more than a limited sense, 47 the intention of the innocent seller: "what 
matters is whether [A] agreed to sell his goods to the person with whom he is dealing, not why he 
did so or under what name. " 48 Lord Millett, in agreeing with Lord Nicholls, sought to find an 
objectively verifiable correlation between the offer and the acceptance. 49 Evidence of A's intention, 
however clear, was of little consequence when objectively determining the presence of offer and 
39 Note Boulton v Jones (1857) 2H&N 564 (to be 
discussed later) where it remains a moot point whether 
B truly appreciated the mistake that A was making, 
especially with regard to knowledge of A's set-off 
against the previous owner of the shop, although the 
report in (1857) 6 WR 107 might suggest otherwise. 
40 (1871) LR 6 QB 597,610. This analysis was fully 
supported by Professor Qoodhart, op cit at 231. 
41 Cf Hartog v Colin & Shields 119,391.3 All ER 566. 
42 See The Unique Mariner (No 2) (1979) 1 Lloyd's Rep 
37 for a perfect illustration of how B's knowledge, 
viewed objectively, emphasised the unilateral nature of 
A's mistake, rather than the existence of the mistake 
itself. 
43 Op cit, Spencer, especially at 106-7. 
44 Cf Lord Nicholls (2003) UKHL 62; 120031.3 WLR 
1371 at (101 who seems to intimate that objectivity 
should be assessed through the eyes of A. 
45 See, for example, Lord Walker, ibid at [1831. 
46 Compare Boulton v Jones (1857) 27 LJ Ex 117 and 
Cundy v Lindsay (1878) .3 
App Cas 459. 
47 (2003) UKHL 62; (200.31 
.3 
WLR 1.371 at 1101 where 
Lord Nicholls states that "for the purpose of deciding 
whether a person had the necessary intention to enter 
into a contract with the crook, a person's intention is 
considered more narrowly. It is assessed by reference to 
what he believed the position to be. " 
48 Ibid at (281. 
49 Ibid at (971. 
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acceptance. 50 Lord Hobhouse steadfastly refused to conduct any "factual enquiry into extraneous 
facts not known to both of the parties". " As the parties had entered a written contract, the parol 
intentions of the parties had no bearing on the identification of the parties as this had become a 
question of documentary construction. Lord Phillips's approach was very different: "The object 
of the exercise is to determine what each party intended, or must be deemed to have intended", 
deducing such intentions "from their words and conduct". 52 Finally, Lord Walker seemingly 
favoured the approach taken by Lord Phillips, but attempted to reconcile all of the above views: 
"The objective nature of the enquiry tends to narrow [the difference] between the person for whom the 
offer or acceptance is intended and the person to whom it is directed. I venture to suggest that the right 
question to ask ... 
is to whom the offer is made (or to whom acceptance of an offer is made)". 53 
3. Objectivity in Dealing or Intention? 
The differences of approach advocated by their Lordships were critical to their final decisions. By 
adopting a restrictive definition of intention, Lords Millett and Nicholls were able to conclude that 
a hire-purchase contract had been formed between Shogun and the rogue. Offer and acceptance 
correlated exactly, with evidence of the buyer's fraud going to subsequent remedy rather than initial 
contract validity. These views find resonance in Lewis v Averay, 54 where Lord Denning MR stated: 
"... we do not look into his intentions, or into his mind to know what he was thinking or into the mind 
of the rogue. We look to outward appearances. " 
Did this mean that As intention to contract with a particular individual could only be defined by 
reference to "outward appearances", or that, in assessing such "outward appearances", the supposed 
intention of A was of secondary importance in determining the identity of the other contracting 
party? There seems little doubt that Lords Millett and Nicholls embraced the latter interpretation. 55 
Thus, whilst espousing the principles of objectivity, any evidence that went to As state of mind and 
might assist in the task of identifying his intention, would remain hidden from the reasonable 
person's evaluation of the offer and acceptance issue (including the reason why A entered the 
contract). 56 On the facts, the actions of Shogun in carrying out credit reference checks and the 
production of the stolen driving licence by the rogue were presumably irrelevant - such evidence was 
probative of fraud, and its effect, but could not affect whether Shogun was selling the car to the 
person in the showroom. Lord Millett's conclusion was that Shogun believed the impostor was the 
real Mr Patel and that "in that belief it entered into a hiring agreement and authorised the dealer to 
50 Ibid at (87] where his Lordship supports the approach 
adopted by Horridge J in Phillips v Brooks (1919) 2 
KB 243 of separating the "identity" of the buyer (in 
terms of offer and acceptance) from evidence of the 
seller's intention (relevant to the issue of fraud). 
51 Ibid at 155). 
52 Ibid at (125) and (1701. 
53 Ibid at [184]. See also Lord Millett at (71) who 
highlighted the difference between an offer being 
"intended for" a specific person as opposed to being 
"directed" to that person. For a fuller analysis of this 
linguistic minefield, see Williams, Mistake as to Party 
in the Law of Contract, (1945) 2.3 Can Bar Rev 271 
and 380, especially at 390-2. 
54 1197211 QB 198,207. 
55 Cf [2003] UKHL 62; 120031.3 WLR 1371 at (152] 
per Lord Phillips. Note the marked contrast with the 
approach taken bti the Court of Appeal in The Great 
Peace (2002] EWCA Civ 140/, (2003] 3 WLR 1617, 
where the parties' intentions, in the context of common 
mistake, were considered to be of paramount 
importance: see Chandler, Devenney and Poole, 
Common Mistake: Theoretical Justification and 
Remedial Inflexibility [2004] JBL 34. 
56 (2003] UKHL 62; [2003] 3 WLR 1371 at [29] per 
Lord Nicholls. 
13 
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deliver possession of the car to the customer who had so identified himself. "57 The ensuing contract 
might be subsequently rescinded for fraud, but the fraud-induced intention to sell could not 
negative the formation of the contract itself. 58 Indeed, this approach called into question the 
correctness of the House of Lords' decision in Cundy v Lindsay as "objectively speaking there was 
consensus ad idem, though this was vitiated by the fraud which produced it". " 
9 
The views espoused by Lords Nicholls and Millet are crystal clear. Tortuous analysis of the 
metaphysical characteristics of identity are seemingly consigned to the preserve of academia. An 
objective test is being employed primarily to identify whether the physical exchange of offer and 
acceptance has occurred between the parties, rather than to whether the parties (objectively) 
intended to make such an exchange. This truncated form of objectivity is directed solely to one 
aspect of contract formation (namely, what the parties did), circumventing any evidential 
presumptions that might facilitate a clearer understanding of what the parties intended. A is 
"treated as intending to contract with the person with whom he is dealing", 60 whether that be the 
person standing in front of him or the person to whom he is writing. Naturally, this raises the 
question of the relationship between the principles of offer and acceptance on the one hand and the 
principles of unilateral mistake on the other. Lord Millett, drawing from the dissenting judgment of 
Devlin LJ in Ingram v Little, 6' advocated a two-stage approach: (i) is there sufficient correlation 
between offer and acceptance and if so (ii) is the `agreement' affected by mistake? In relation to the 
second question, his Lordship was clearly of the opinion that a unilateral mistake as to identity did 
not render a `contract' void but rather, as Lord Denning MR had suggested, only voidable 62 
Returning to the facts of Cundy v Lindsay, where A had directed his acceptance to B's address, Lord 
Millett stated that: 
"The goods were ordered by Blenkarn posing as Blenkiron & Co. and supplied and invoiced to him in 
that name. Outwardly the acceptance did correspond with the offer". 63 
Thus, the name proffered by B appears irrelevant, representing a mere "label" by which a person 
can be identified, as transient as an address or occupation. TM Rather, what matters is the physical 
transmission of the acceptance to the person who ordered the goods -a seductively uncomplicated 
approach, but does it provide the required level of predictability? Lord Nicholls certainly showed 
no inclination to add any further refinements to the "dealing" test: once the owner of goods had 
agreed to part with ownership of those goods on the basis of a fraudulent misrepresentation, a 
contract had been formed, albeit voidable in nature. However, this suggests that if B fraudulently 
intercepts and thereupon accepts an offer from A to C then a contract nevertheless ensues. The 
physical transmission of offer and acceptance has occurred between A and B, with B's fraud simply 
leading A to believe that he is still dealing with C. Such a conclusion would clearly undermine the 
role of objectivity in determining whether an outwardly intended exchange of offer and acceptance 
57 [bid at (107]. 
58 Ibid at 161 per Lord Nicholls. 
59 Ibid at 197]. See also 11081-11091 where Lord Millets 
specifically calls for the House to overrule its decision 
in Cundy v Lindsay, a view which is also adopted by 
Lord Nicholls at 1341-135]. 
60 Ibid at [811 per Lord Millett (emphasis added). The 
same test was used by Lord Nicholls when re- 
considering the facts of Cundy v Lindsay, at 128] and 
[31]. 
61 1196111 QB 3 1. 
62 See Lewis v Averay 11972] 1 QB 198,206-207. 
Quaere the circumstances, if any, in which a contract 
could be voidable in Equity on the ground of mistaken 
identity; cf Beatson, Anson's Law of Contract, 28th 
edn., (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2002) at 345- 
347, and Huyton SA v Distribuidora Internacional de 
Productos Agricolas SA 1200.31 EWHC 2088. 
63 [bid at (97]; see also (341-(351 per Lord Nicholls. 
64 Lord Phillips supported this view, ibid at (120]. 
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had occurred. 6S Lord Nicholls' approach also suggests that the decision in Boulton C, Jones, "" is now 
to be doubted. The facts were that the defendant had ordered goods from Brocklehurst, prompted 
by an existing set-off for that amount. Unfortunately, Brocklehurst had sold his shop, that day, to 
the plaintiff. The Court of Exchequer ruled that the defendant had sent an offer to Brocklehurst 
which therefore could not be accepted by the plaintiff. Applying Lord Nicholls' test would 
inevitably lead to the formation of a contract as the parties had physically corresponded with one 
another. Certainly there was no suggestion that the plaintiff had fraudulently intercepted the 
defendant's offer to Brocklehurst. 6' 
Perhaps the above analysis led to Lord Millett's positive support for the decision in Boulton v Jones. 
His Lordship commented that as the goods had been "ordered from Brocklehurst but supplied and 
invoiced by Boulton; the acceptance did not correspond with the offer". 68 Thus, according to Lord 
Millett, in Cundy A was dealing with B, where the recipient was named as C but operated from B's 
address, whilst in Boulton A was dealing with B, where the order was sent to B at C's address. 69 Can 
this apparent conflict be reconciled? One possible argument is that the two cases demonstrate the 
importance of first identifying whether the rogue is the offeror or offeree, a point rarely mentioned 
in Shogun. 7Q In Cundy, the court's attention was focussed on the offeror's identity - the offeree 
simply accepted the offer from the rogue, sending it back to the address given. Conversely, in 
Boulton, it was the offeree's identity that was at issue - the offeree purported to accept an offer 
directed to a differently named person. ' Lord Millett sought to circumvent this difficulty by 
suggesting that as the plaintiff, in Boulton, could not accept an offer addressed to another person, 
his remittance of the order represented a counter-offer which the defendant accepted in the 
mistaken belief that it was made by Brocklehurst. 72 With respect, this interpretation is equally 
difficult to sustain as it is clear that the defendant had no knowledge of any change of the shop's 
ownership until after he had consumed the goods. Surely no contract can be formed where A 
makes an offer to B, which is countered by C" and then mistakenly accepted by A? In conclusion, 
we are left with the distinct impression that the "dealing" test advocated by Lords Nicholls and 
Millett retains the capacity for producing unpredictable decisions, with Lord Nicholls' version 
offering a more workable solution provided clearer guidance is given on such issues as fraudulent 
interception, and the comparative relevance of B's personal details where A has wrrongly addressed 
his offer or acceptance either in terms of the named recipient or stated address. 
In contrast to the above, Lords Phillips and Walker adopted a more traditional analysis in which 
divining A's apparent intention would determine with whom the offer and acceptance had taken 
place. In the words of Lord Phillips, where two people had reached an agreement, "the court asks the 
65 Lord Millets, ibid at [63], noted that a physical 
transmission of offer and acceptance would not create 
a contract where a fraudulent interception of the offer 
or acceptance had taken place. 
66 (1857)2H&N564. 
67 Cf Cheshire, Mistake as Affecting Contractual 
Consent, (1944) 60 LQR 174,185, who argues that 
the facts demonstrated that the plaintiff had acted 
negligently in the circumstances. 
68 120031 VIKHL 62; [20031 3 WLR 1371 at 1971. 
Arguably, the real question should have been whether 
an offer sent to a shop, but addressed to a named 
individual, could reasonably be supposed to be 
addressed to that individual or to the owner of that 
shop at the time the offer was received. 
69 Note that Lord Millet's test would ignore any facts 
that went to A's intention; eg in Boulton, that A was 
unaware that C now operated from B's old address or 
that his reason for placing the order was the existence 
of a set-off against Brocklehurst. Support for this 
analysis can he found in Williams. op cit at 388-90. 
70 See, however, Lord Hobhouse's analysis at [4,71 where 
the nature of credit transactions and the role of the 
rogue, as offeror, is an important consideration. 
71 (2003] UKHL 62; (20031 3 WLR 1371 at f/701. 
72 Ibid at [961. 
73 Quaere if this is possible. 
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question whether each intended, or must be deemed to have intended, to contract with the other". 74 
It is at this point that some members of the academic fraternity might lick their lips with delight, 
confident in the belief that the pursuit of "intention" necessarily leads the court back to an 
investigation of why A considered B's identity to be so fundamental, 75 why the difference between 
B and C was so crucial to the ensuing contract, 7' and how one might characterise the relevant 
totality of B's identity. 77 However, their Lordships managed to avoid any incursion into such sterile 
territory. Lord Phillips simply concentrated on "deducing the intention of the parties from their 
words and conduct, "78 an approach fully supported by Lord Walker who concluded that Shogun 
evidenced a clear intention to accept the offer seemingly made by the real Mr Patel . 
7' The relevant 
intention was not based on the importance of B's identity but rather on the manifest conduct of 
A. In short, instead of focusing on why A intended to deal with B, the enquiry is redirected towards 
how A demonstrated this intention, rendering superfluous any separate body of rules for unilateral 
mistake of identity. Nevertheless, the fact that one party had mistaken the identity of his co- 
contractor might remain an important factor in assessing intention within the more appropriate 
context of contract. 
In summary, Lords Phillips and Walker clearly relied on the same form of objectivity at the 
contract formation stage as employed by courts to deduce the terms (and meaning) of an ensuing 
contract, or even when applying the remoteness test to the assessment of damages for breach of 
contract: in each situation, the outward intentions of the parties remain a primary constituent of 
objectivity. However, the germ of unpredictability, particularly in face to face dealings, remains. 
Lord Phillips admits as much when recognising that "the innocent party will have in mind, when 
considering with whom he is contracting, both the person with whom he is in contact and the third 
party whom he imagines the person to be". 81 Lords Phillips and Walker sought to resolve this 
potential conflict between physical evidence and apparent intention by clarifying and strengthening 
existing evidential presumptions with regard to inter praesentes and inter absentes dealings. It is this 
development which, it is respectfully argued, will truly result in the jettisoning of the more esoteric 
"mistake of identity" jurisprudence. 
4. Face to face dealings 
The presumption that A intends to deal with B where negotiations have been conducted face-to- 
face can be traced back to the speech of Lord Penzance in Cundy v Lindsay. 82 Although no 
explanation for this presumption was immediately forthcoming it seems superficially justifiable for 
74 (2003] UKHL 62; (2003) 3 WLR 1371 at (125). 
75 Eg Phillips v Brooks (1919) 2 KB 243 and Lewis v 
Averay (1972) 1 QB 198. In both cases A's mistake 
about the creditworthiness of B was not considered 
sufficiently fundamental to invalidate the contract. 
76 Traditionally it has always been thought essential that 
C, the party with whom A thought he was dealing, 
does actually exist; eg King's Norton Metal. Co v 
Edridge Merrett & Co Ltd (1897) 14 TLR 98. 
77 Cf Treitel, The Law of Contract, 1I th ed (Sweet cý 
Maxwell, London, 200.3), at 302, who rightly observes 
that it is quite possible that A believes that C's whole 
identity is represented by some "identifying attribute" 
(eg membership of a particular college). 
78 See ]2003] UKHL 62; [20031.3 1W'LR 1371 at [1701. 
Lord Phillips also drew upon prior case law that had 
relied upon objective intention: see, for example, (1271, 
(129], (133], (135], (138], (141]. 
79 Ibid at 11911. 
80 Ibid especially at [1231-11251; see also The Hannah 
Blumenthal (1983] 1 All ER 
. 
34 and The Leonidas D 
(1985] 1 WLR 925. 
81 lbid at (153]. 
82 (1878) 3 App Cas 459,471-472. Cf the earlier 
decision in Hardman v Booth (1863) 1H&C 803 
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at least three reasons: (i) to all outward appearances the process of offer and acceptance has been 
concluded physically between A and B, 8; (ii) to some extent, A's argument that B's identity was of 
critical importance is less convincing if he (A) does not know what B looks like, 84 and (iii) as there 
were only two primary means of communicating at the time of Cundy, by post or orally, there was 
an apparent logic in identifying one of those mediums as being more, or less, susceptible to a 
finding of mistake. 85 Nowadays, of course, there is a multiplicity of communication channels 
available, even to the average consumer. Thus, in Shogun, Lord Millett questioned why other types 
of quasi-physical communications should not also be included in the presumption; for example, 
conversations held over the telephone or via the use of some form of televisual link: 
"If the of feree's words of acceptance are taken to be addressed to the physical person standing in his 
presence who made the offer, what is the position where they deal with each other by telephone? Is the 
disembodied voice to be equated with physical presence? "' 
There is clearly considerable merit in this suggestion. 87 The existing presumption may be predicated 
on the physical immediacy of the parties but in the age of videophones and GPS satellite 
communications' technology the distinction between inter presentes and inter absentes loses some of 
its meaning. Nor can it be argued that physical presence gives A an opportunity to ask for some 
form of immediate identification from B, perhaps impractical during telephonic or televisual 
communication. Leaving aside the ubiquitous fax machine (employed in Shogun), physical proof of 
identity is not the basis upon which a court would assess A's intention to deal with B, nor can it affect 
whether A directed his offer to B. Regrettably this matter was left unresolved as their Lordships 
proceeded on the basis that they were dealing with a written contract. Nevertheless, as the rogue was 
physically present in the car showroom, but dealt with the finance company via fax, one may 
conclude that any fundamental extension in the definition of "face to face" was implicitly rejected. 88 
With regard to the presumption itself, none of their Lordships suggested its abolition. Indeed, Lord 
Millett's arguments seemingly rendered it conclusive for, by emphasising the "dealing" test, it 
necessarily followed that in face to face dealings there was only one person that A could be dealing with, 
the person in front of him. If further justification was needed, his Lordship persuasively argued that, 
"there is surely nothing to be said for resorting to a rebuttable presumption in order to resolve a question 
of fact lie dealing/ which is incapable of being determined by the evidence. If there is no test by which 
the question can be answered on the evidence, there is none by which the Court can determine whether 
the presumption has been rebutted. "" 
On the other hand, Lords Phillips, Nicholls and Walker preferred to strengthen the presumption, 
where the issue of face to lice dealings vas seemingly 
irrelevant. 
8.3 Eg Phillips a Brooks 11919) 2 
KB 243. 
84 See, however, Hardman t, Booth 118631 1H&C 803, 
where the presumption was successfully, albeit 
implicitly, rebutted. 
85 Leading texts have consistently suggested that operative 
mistake was easier to establish where the parties had 
dealt with each other inter absences; see, far example, 
Cheshire, Fifoot & Furmston, Law of Contract, 8th 
ed, (Butterworths, London, 1972) at 230 and the 
similar comments in the 14th ed (2001) at 280. 
86 (2003] UKHL 62; (2003] 3 WLR 1371 at [69J; cf 
Entores 
t' Miles 
Far East Corp 1195.512 QB 327 at 
332 per Denning W. 
87 Lord Nicholls, ibid at (36], preferred to extend the face 
to face presumption to all types of communication, 
including contracts concluded by written 
correspondence; see also Lord Millets at [70]. 
88 See, for example, Lord Phillips at (170] and Lord 
Hothouse at [511. Lord Walker, at [811, suggested the 
possible extension of the presumption to telephonic 
negotiations, but certainly no further. 
89 Ibid at (67]. 
17 
Journal of Obligation and Remedies August 2004 
struggling to find a suitable example where the presumption"" could, in practice, be rebutted, 
although Lord Walker did mention the celebrated story of the fraudulent Tichborne claimant who 
resorted to physical disguise in order to give the impression that he possessed a certain type of 
historical family resemblance. " Lord Nicholls summed up the general mood by saying, 
"The factual postulate necessary to bring the presumption into operation is that a person (0) believes 
that the person with whom he is dealing is the person the latter has represented himself to be. Evidence 
that the other's identity was of importance to 0, and evidence of the steps taken to check the other's 
identity, will lead nowhere if the transaction proceeds on the basis of the underlying factual 
postulate. "92 
The face-to-face presumption now seems to verge on the irrebuttable and we can be reasonably 
confident that the esoteric distinctions of identity and attributes drawn in Ingram v Little, 93 Hector 
v L-vons, 94 and Lake v Simmons, " will no longer be repeated. This then leaves us with the issue of 
contracts in writing. 
5. Written correspondence and written contracts 
In Shogun Lord Millett forcefully argued that, in principle, there should be no distinction between 
agreements concluded inter praesentes and agreements concluded inter absentes: "' 
"... in truth the distinction was always unsound. If the of feree's words of acceptance are taken to be 
addressed to the physical person standing in his presence who made the offer, why is the contract entered 
into by correspondence different? Why is the of feree's letter of acceptance not taken to be addressed to 
the physical person who made the written offer which he is accepting? The offeree addresses the offeror 
by his assumed name in both cases. Why should this he treated as decisive in the one case and 
disregarded in the other? $997 
Nevertheless, the majority of their Lordships in Shogun were of the opinion that when an 
agreement was in writing, 98 the identification of the parties was a matter of construction. This 
90 Lord Hobhouse did not consider the presumption as the 
facts demonstrated a written contract concluded inter 
absentes; however, ibid at (51], he implicitly accepts the 
utility of the face to face presumption. 
91 See (2003] UKHL 62; 120031.3 WLR 1371 at (187], 
an interesting paragraph on different forms of 
deception. 
92 Ibid at (. 37]. 
93 (1988) 58 P& CR 156, where a test of "direct and 
important materiality" was proposed by Sir Nicholas 
Browne-Wilkinson VC (as he then was). 
. 
94 Note that in Lake v Simmons (1927] AC 487 it was 
only Viscount Haldane's obiter comments (especially at 
500-1) that suggested the contract between the original 
parties might have been void for mistake. 
95 Cf Lord Hobhouse, in Shogun (2003] UKHL 62; 
(2003) 3 WLR 1 
. 
37] at (47], stated that in a 
consumer credit transaction the identity of the customer 
is "fundamental to the whole transaction" as it is 
essential to the checking of the credit rating of the 
borrower. 
9t See also Lord Nicholls, ibid at 1261-(341. Even Lord 
Phillips was "strongly attracted" to such an argument, 
at (1701. 
97 1200.31 UKHL 62; (2003] 3 WLR 1371 at (70(; see 
also (28( per Lord Nicholls. 
98 Quaere whether, in this context, the majority in Shogun 
considered written contracts to include those formed via 
the use of e-mail and fax. Lord Walker, ibid at (188(, 
suggested they did and this is supported by other 
authorities; see, for example, Derby & Co Ltd v Weldon (No. 9) (1991) 2 All ER 901 and Pretty Pictures v 
Quixote Films Ltd (2003) EWHC 311 at 1111. 
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approach seemed to mimic the application of the, so-called, parol evidence rule. ' The apparent 
simplicity of this approach does, however, mask a number of issues. 
First, what is the position where A and B deal inter praesentes and make use of written documents? " 
Presumably, if the relevant documents do not make reference to the parties to the putative 
contract, the situation will be treated as a face-to-face dealing and the relevant presumption applied. 
By contrast, where the relevant documents do purport to identify the parties to the putative 
contract, presumably the construction approach will be appropriate if the documents were 
intended"' to represent the agreement, or where, although not containing all of the terms, they 
included some terms and identified the parties. 10' This appeared to be the view of the majority of 
their Lordships in Shogun. 1°; 
Secondly, to what extent, if any, can extrinsic evidence be used in the construction process? 104 If it 
is accepted that a name is essentially a label, "' there is considerable merit in Lord Millett's 
argument that: 
"... once it is established that the person whose name and other personal details are stated in the contract 
and the person who stated them and signed the contract are not the same, the question immediately 
arises: which of them should be treated as the counterparty? Do the name and other details included in 
the contract refer to the person to whom they belong or to the impostor who included them in order to 
identify himself?.. 
. 
To say, as my noble and learned friend, Lord Hobhouse of Woodborough, does, that 
it is a question of construction which admits of only one answer, with respect simply begs the 
question. "106 
There was, however, a divergence of opinion amongst the majority as to the extent to which it was 
permissible to use extrinsic evidence in the construction process. In respect of inter absentes 
dealings Lord Hobhouse adopted a restrictive approach, essentially only admitting extrinsic 
evidence where there was ambiguity or to establish that a person had signed as an agent. 107 His 
Lordship, however, did make an exception in respect of pseudonyms and this would presumably 
explain King's Norton Metal Co Ltd t' Edridge, Merrett & Co. 1°8 This approach appears consistent 
with the long established principle that in relation to written contracts intention is to be 
ascertained by reference to the language used, 1°' but there is some support in the case law at least 
99 See (2003) UKHL 62; (2003) 3 WLR 1371 at (49) per 
Lord Hobhouse, (154) per Lord Phillips and (188) per 
Lord Walker. Note that the Law Commission u, us of the 
opinion that the `rule' uxu based on the intentions of the 
parties: see Law of Contract: The Parol Evidence Rule 
(Law Cam No. 154, Cmnd. 9700,1986). As such, 
their Lordships did not distinguish between situations 
where there was a written contract and contracts 
concluded by written correspondence, an approach 
consistent with that of the Law Commission, at 2.18. 
100 In Shogun it was argued that the dealings took place 
inter praesentes through the `agency' of the dealer. 
Lords Hobhouse and Walker thought that the dealer 
was not Shogun's agent and this seems consistent with 
Branwhite v Worcester Works Finance Ltd (1969) 1 
AC 552. Lord Phillips had more difficulty with this 
point: see (176]. 
101 Cf Allen v Pink (1838) 4M&W 140. 
102 See Law Commission Report, Law of Contract: The 
Parol Evidence Rule (Law Com No 154, Cmnd 9700, 
1986), at 2.19. 
103 [20031 IKHL 62; (2003] 3 WLR 1371 at (49] per 
Lord Hobhouse, (1661 per Lord Phillips and 1192] per 
Lord Walker. 
104 Fraud and mistake are, of course, exceptions to the 
parol evidence rule: see Pickering v. Dowson (1813) 4 
Taunt 779 and Raffles t' Wichelhaus respectively. 
105 Ibid (120] - 1122] in which Lord Phillips provides an 
illuminating discussion of the nature of names. 
106 Ibid at (1031. 
107 Ibid at (491. See also Dumford Trading AG t' OAO 
Atlantrybf lot (May 1I th, 2004, unreported); cf 
Campbell Discount Co v Gall [1961] 1 QB 431. 
108 (1897) 14 TLR 98. 
109 Cf Lewison, The Interpretation of Contracts, 2nd ed, 
(Sweet & Maxwell, London, 1997), at 7-8. 
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in this context, for a less restrictive approach. For example, in Cundy v Lindsay10 there is a 
suggestion that the result might have been different if Lindsay had not known of Blenkiron's 
operations. "' For this reason Lord Phillips"' was prepared to admit "appropriate" extrinsic 
evidence, although there is little discussion of when such evidence might be "appropriate". "' Lord 
Phillips did, however, state that: 
"... a person carrying on negotiations in writing can, by describing as one of the parties to the putative 
agreement, an individual who is unequivocally identifiable from that description, preclude a finding 
that the party to the putative agreement is other than the person so described. The process of 
construction will lead inexorably to the conclusion that the person with whom the other party intended 
to contract was the person thus described. ""' 
Thirdly, to what extent would a different result be reached where a formal written contract resulted 
from the parties having dealt face to face? This issue had already been addressed by the Court of 
Appeal in Hector v Lyons, 15 but the decision now commanded the closest scrutiny by their 
Lordships in Shogun. The facts were that the plaintiff, a Martin Aloysius Handel Hector, 
negotiated, inter praesentes, the purchase of a house from the defendant. At all times the defendant 
understood that she was dealing with the plaintiff. However, for reasons which are not entirely 
clear, when the formal contract was being drawn up the plaintiff instructed the solicitors to name 
his son, Martin Aloysius Handel, as the purchaser. The plaintiff then signed the contract but not 
with his normal signature. Subsequently, the plaintiff, claiming to be the purchaser, sought to 
enforce the contract. The action was rejected and the appeal dismissed, apparently on the ground 
that the purchaser was Mr Hector junior. "6 In dismissing the appeal Sir Nicholas Browne- 
Wilkinson V-C, referring to the principles governing oral contracts, stated: 
"In my judgment the principle there enunciated has no application to a case such as the present where 
there is a contract and wholly in writing There the identity of the vendor and of the purchaser is 
established by the names of the parties included in the written contract. "117 
In Shogun Lord Hobhouse characteristically approved the decision and the reasoning in Hector v 
Lyons. Lord Walker thought that Hector v Lyons did not help the defendant in Shogun but stopped 
short of approving the decision. By contrast, Lord Phillips admitted to having: 
"... difficulty in understanding the basis on which the trial judge concluded that the purchaser described 
in the contract was the son rather than the father. The father has carried out the negotiations, he had 
signed the agreement, albeit not with his customary signature, and he bore the forenames and the 
surname of the purchaser, as described in the contract. ""' 
110 (1878) 3 App Cas 459. 
111 See also Boulton v Jones (1857) 27 LJ Ex 117,118, 
per Bramwell B. 
112 Lord Walker appeared to adopt a similar approach to 
Lord Phillips; see [20031 UKHL 62; [200-31.3 WLR 
1371 at (188]-(192]. 
113 In Shogun there were relatively few problems in 
discerning intention; see, for example, Lord Hobhouse 
at (48]. 
114 [2003] UKHL 62; [2003] 3 WLR 1371 at (161]. 
Quaere on this approach why the knowledge of 
Lindsay and Co was relevant in Cundy v Lindsay; 
perhaps because the goods were addressed and 
dispatched to "Messrs Blenkiron & Co, 37 Wood 
Street" whereas the firm was called `W Blenkiron & 
Son' and carried on its business at 12.3 Wood Street. 
115(1988)58P&CR 156. 
116 There is some doubt whether this aspect was actually 
appealed: cf Shogun at [1011 per Lord M it left and 
[166] per Lord Phillips 
117 (1988) 58 P& CR 156,159. 
11812003] UKHL 62; [20031 3 WLR 1371 at [166]. 
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Later in his speech Lord Phillips appeared to move further from the position of Lord Hobhouse 
when distinguishing dealings which were exclusively in writing from dealings where there was some 
"personal contact": 
"Where there is some form of personal contact between individuals who are conducting negotiations, 
this approach [identifying intention from words and conduct] gives rise to problems. In such a situation 
I would favour the application of a strong presumption that each intends to contract with the other, with 
whom he is dealing. Where, however, the dealings are exclusively conducted in writing, there is no scope 
or need for such a presumption. "11' 
The irony here is that Lord Phillips appears to be using the "dealing" test advocated by Lord 
Millett; a test which emphasises the physical communication of offer and acceptance rather than 
the intention which lies behind that communication, typically epitomised by the name of the 
addressee. Perhaps in practice the difference between the approaches adopted by Lords Millett and 
Phillips is not as unbridgable as we have suggested? 
Finally, prior to Shogun it was generally assumed that in order for a `contract' to be void for mistake 
of identity it would need to be shown that A "took all reasonable steps to verify the identity of the 
person with whom he was invited to deal. "12° Is this still relevant in the light of Shogun? The 
`dealing' test' proposed by Lords Nicholls and Millett would render such considerations 
redundant. '' By contrast, Lords Phillips and Walker focused, as we have seen, on how A 
demonstrated his intention and what better way of doing this than by checking C's identity? 
Provided that any written evidence was not conclusive on this matter, it would seem logical to 
assume that the more precautions A takes, the more likely that a reasonable person will believe that 
A, on objective grounds, intends to deal with C not B. Does this mean that the inter absentes 
presumption of Lords Phillips and Walker might be rebutted where A does not make any checks? 
Certainly it is interesting to observe that the judges'22 who were impressed by Shogun's processes 
found for the claimant whereas those who ignored the claimant's investigative processes, or were 
positively scathing about them, 123 found for the defendant. 
6. Conclusion 
The approaches adopted by Lords Millett and Nicholls, or by Lords Phillips and Walker, are 
equally defensible' 24. Fundamentally, the issue remains one of identifying the parties. In Cundy it 
is perfectly justifiable to conclude that as the acceptance was sent to B's address, a contract between 
A and B resulted. Conversely, as the goods were sent to a differently named party (C) it is equally 
valid to suggest that no contract between A and B occurred. Neither conclusion requires recourse 
to the metaphysical aspects of a person's identity, but only one can prevail if the common law is 
119 lbid at 11701 (emphasis added). 
120 Cheshire, Fifoot & Furmston, Law of Contract, 14th 
ed, (Butterworths, London, 2001) at 280; cf 
Hardman v Booth [186.311 H&C 803. 
121 Overall the approach of Lords Nicholls and Millets 
was influenced by the view that X is more innocent 
than A: see (351 and (82]. Cheshire, op. cit at 187, 
also assumes that A is normally more negligent than 
X. However, Lord Walker cogently argued that it is 
not clear that X will always be more innocent than A: 
see [1821. Indeed in Shogun the assistant recorder 
thought that Mr Hudson had acted "carelessly": see 
120011 EWCA Civ 1000 at (31. 
122 Lords Phillips and Walker: see [1781 and [1911 
respectively. 
123 Sedley Li: 120011 EWCA Civ 1000, [20021 QB 834 
at [121. 
124 Although the approach of Lords Willett and Nicholls 
might make European harmonisation easier: see [20031 
(TKHL 62; [20031.3 WLR 1371 at [861. 
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to retain the required level of certainty. Asking whether A intended to deal with B, or physically 
directed his offer or acceptance to B, are simple linguistic variations on the same theme; that is, 
who are the parties? Either test can be used, or misused, to reach artificially convenient solutions, 
but whether this leaves us in a better position than previously remains a moot point at present. 
Undoubtedly the speeches in Shogun will become important touchstones for any future 
development in cases involving mistaken identity. The importance of adopting a detached form of 
objective factual analysis will continue to weaken the stranglehold that Cundy v Lindsay has 
imposed on this area, even if the majority in Shogun did not see fit to overrule the actual decision. 
Moreover, the prominence given to the rules of offer and acceptance, linked with the strengthening 
of presumptions with regard to inter praesentes and inter absentes dealings, should discourage any 
future judicial examination of the difference between a person's attributes and identity. But a 
considerable amount of uncertainty remains, especially with regard to the 2: 2 split over the central 
issue of what overriding test is most appropriate for resolving issues of mistaken identity. It is 
indeed ironic that having largely substituted the mechanistic rules of contract formation for the, 
hitherto, more rarefied rules of mistaken identity, lower courts presented with similar facts will 
struggle to find authoritative statements of principle that commanded the support of the majority 
in Shogun. 
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